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Abstract
Phishing is a way of stealing people’s sensitive information such as username, password and banking
details by disguising as a legitimate entity (i.e. email, website). Anti-phishing education considered to
be vital in strengthening “human”, the weakest link in information security. Previous research in antiphishing education focuses on improving educational interventions to better interact the end user.
However, one can argue that existing anti-phishing educational interventions are limited in success due
to their outdated teaching content incorporated. Furthermore, teaching outdated anti-phishing
techniques might not help combat contemporary phishing attacks. Therefore, this research focuses on
investigating the obfuscation techniques of phishing URLs used in anti-phishing education against the
contemporary phishing attacks reported in PhishTank.com. Our results showed that URL obfuscation
with IP address has become insignificant and it revealed two emerging URL obfuscation techniques, that
attackers use lately, haven’t been incorporated into existing anti-phishing educational interventions.
Keywords Identity Theft, Phishing, Anti-Phishing Education, Usable Security, URL obfuscation
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the advancement of the Internet, World-Wide-Web and mobile devices, ordinary people are
increasingly adapting to rely on technology in every aspect of their modern life ranging from online
shopping, socialising, education to entertainment (Arachchilage et al., 2016). As people's reliance on the
internet grows, Internet fraud and cybercrime have become a greater threat for both individuals and
organisations (Arachchilage and Love, 2014). APWG 1 (Anti Phishing Working Group) defines phishing
as the act of stealing personal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, credit card
information and online banking details using either social engineering techniques or technical
subterfuge. The social engineering aspect of phishing sends electronic messages (i.e. email, social media,
text, online advertisements) to lure users to enter their user-credentials at a spoofed web page which
looks and feels identical to a legitimate site (Zhang et al., 2007). On the other hand, it could also install
a malicious software application on the user's device or to just open an attachment. For example, a victim
might get the same look and feel email from his bank (with the bank logo and colours), asking him to
click on a link given in the email body to visit the bank’s website and verify the account details for a given
security reason. The link will be directed to a counterfeit website of the targeted bank. If the user gets
deceived by the similarity of the fake website's user interface, s/he will then enter the sensitive
information even without noticing that s/he has become a victim of phishing. Phishing attacks use social
engineering techniques (Khonji et al., 2011) as it’s easy to take advantage of the human mentality by
misusing how humans assign meaning to content (i.e. phishing is also known as semantic attack
(Arachchilage et al., 2016)) rather than breaking into the systems straightaway (Kumaraguru et al.,
2007).
As of 2019 Webroot threat report 2, the number of phishing sites detected has grown to 220% between
January and December of 2018. According to the APGW 2019 trend report, the number of unique
phishing websites reported in the month of March 2019 is 81122. As of 2018 FBI (Federal Bureau of
Investigation) Internet Crime Complaint Centre (IC3) report 3, more than $1.3 billion financial losses
have been reported in 2018 under phishing based cyber-attacks (including phishing-based Business
Email Compromise (BEC) and E-mail Account Compromise (EAC) attacks). Apart from financial loss,
targeted phishing attacks (spear phishing) can damage the reputation of organisations and public figures
(Gupta et al., 2018) by exposing their private details to the public. John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary
Clinton’s presidential campaign received an email on the 19 of March 2016, with a password reset link,
stating that his Gmail account has been compromised 4. Induced by fear, Podesta disclosed his Gmail
login credentials at the provided counterfeit website of the Gmail’s password reset page. Attackers got
access to all important work emails including inner details of the Clinton campaign, internal political
conflicts of the Clinton Foundation and even Podesta’s iCloud account password, which resulted in
changing the public opinion on Hillary Clinton and her association’s professional conduct.
Anti-phishing educational interventions have a major role in combating against phishing attacks by
transforming “human” the weakest link in cybersecurity (Arachchilage et al., 2016), to the strongest
defence. Despite the number of phishing awareness mechanisms developed over the last few decades,
the phishing threat is growing (APWG, 2019). Previous research in anti-phishing education have focused
on improving teaching methods (i.e. game based anti-phishing teaching (Arachchilage and Love, 2014)),
user interactions (Dixon et al., 2019) and user behaviour modification (Arachchilage et al., 2016; Downs
et al., 2007) as the means of mitigating phishing threat. User behaviour modifications to training users
to pay attention to the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) of the website is one of the key points in every
anti-phishing program (Arachchilage, 2012; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012). Alsharnouby et al. (2005)
conducted a research study using an eye-tracking device which revealed that users are paying attention
to the URLs as they were trained in anti-phishing awareness programs.
However, even though users pay significant attention to the URL, majority of ordinary users fail to
recognise contemporary phishing URLs (Alsharnouby et al., 2015) if the particular obfuscation
technique was not covered in training programs. Therefore, one can argue that existing anti-phishing
educational interventions are limited in success due to their outdated teaching content incorporated.
Moreover, teaching outdated anti-phishing techniques might not help combat contemporary phishing
attacks. This research focuses on investigating the obfuscation techniques of phishing URLs used in antiphishing education against the contemporary phishing attacks reported in PhishTank.com.

http://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg\_trends\_report\_q1\_2019.pdf
https://www-cdn.webroot.com/9315/5113/6179/2019_Webroot_Threat_Report_US_Online.pdf
3 https://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2018\_IC3Report.pdf
4 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-phishing-email-that-hacked-the-account-of-john-podesta
1
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Section 2 of the paper discusses the related work and section 3 describes the methodology and design
followed in the research. Section 4 presents the results obtained by following various analysis according
to the research design and discuss what's missing in the phishing awareness mechanisms that are
required to fight against the contemporary phishing threats. Finally, section 5 provides the conclusion
of the research and possible future work to follow-up the findings in this paper.

2 RELATED WORK
The approaches to mitigate phishing threat takes two directions (Qabajeh et al., 2018). One is the
development of anti-phishing tools and security mechanisms to automate phishing threat prevention
within the computer systems, servers and networks. The other is the development of anti-phishing
awareness programs to prevent threats at the end-user level (Alsharnouby et al., 2015). Automated antiphishing tools are not foolproof (Wen et al., 2019) as they miss out at least 20 per cent of phishing attacks
(Almomani et al., 2013). And particularly until a phishing URL is detected and registered in a spam
database (Heartfield and Loukas, 2018), it’s disastrous to the public. The time taken to detect a new
phishing attack depends on its complexity but estimated as 24 to 96 hours. However, the Phishing
Threat Report by Verizon 5 confirms that most people who are going to click on a malicious link in a
phishing email do so in just over an hour and that first victim of a phishing attack falls for it within 82
seconds of the encounter. Adding to that, more than 1.5 million new phishing sites are getting created
every month 6. Therefore, it’s a far too long goal for automated anti-phishing tools to detect all new
phishing attack as soon as they appear and protect the early victims. On the contrary, phishing
awareness programs gives a little hope as they can fight to phish at the end-user’s level including zeroday attacks.
Research in phishing awareness takes different paths such as educational programs on using security
alert tools and indicators such as Google Safe Browsing 7, IsThisLegit 8 (Herzberg and Amir, 2009),
training programs with simulated phishing attacks such as knowbe4 9, Cofense 10, shearwater 11, antiphishing games for end-users (Arachchilage et al., 2016; Sheng et al., 2008; Wen et al., 2019),
behavioural studies to understand human weakness against phishing (Dhamija et al., 2006; Downs et
al., 2007), and framework development for phishing threat measurement and awareness (Aleroud and
Zhou, 2017; Garera et al., 2007).
In developing a phishing awareness program, apart from identifying efficient methods of teaching,
selecting the content of the program is vital. As mentioned earlier, training users to examine the URL of
a website is one of the key areas in anti-phishing education. The malicious URL features identified
during machine learning based URL classification research (Garera et al., 2007; Khonji et al., 2011; Ma
et al., 2009; Whittaker et al., 2010) reveals more information on phishing attack types. Anti-phishing
educational programs developed in the past have used these classification results that are visible to the
human eye (Alsharnouby et al., 2015; Arachchilage et al., 2016). Anti-phishing games (Arachchilage and
Love, 2014; Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Sheng et al., 2008) also have given priority in training users to
identify phishing URLs using the cues embodied within the URL itself. Therefore, URL obfuscating
techniques plays a major role in phishing detection (Dhamija et al., 2006; Garera et al., 2007).

2.1 URL obfuscating Techniques
The term URL obfuscation stands for the innovative ways used by phishers to create deceiving phishing
URLs by carefully placing cue words in a URL to trick human mind. The interesting study by Garera et
al. (Garera et al., 2007) has categorised prominent obfuscation techniques by examining the blacklist of
phishing URLs maintained by Google in 2007 (Garera et al., 2007).
•

Type I: Obfuscating the Hostname with an IP Address - URL's hostname (Netloc component) is
obfuscated by the phisher using an IP address. Very often the IP address is also represented in
hex or decimal format rather than the common dotted quad form. An example of this type of
URL is: http://67.210.122.222/ apple/login.

https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/DBIR_2018_Report_execsummary.pdf
https://www-cdn.webroot.com/9315/5113/6179/2019_Webroot_Threat_Report_US_Online.pdf
7 https://safebrowsing.google.com
8 https://github.com/duo-labs/isthislegit
9 https://www.knowbe4.com
10 https://cofense.com
11https://www.shearwater.com.au/
5

6
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•

Type II: Obfuscating the host with another domain - A valid looking domain name is used in the
"path" component of the URL and trick the user to see it as a redirect URL. https://recoveryconfrim-paqe.cf/?facebook.com=chekpoint.

•

Type III: Obfuscating with large hostnames - In this type of obfuscation, phisher appends a large
string of words at the end of a genuine-looking domain name to deceive the target user.

•

Type IV: Domain name unknown or misspelt - The phishing URL may contain a domain name
which is different to the target organisation. This can either be an unknown domain or a misspelt
version of the legitimate domain. As example is: http://www.g0og1e.com.

There has been much research in the past actively using these obfuscation categories with different
features in phishing URL identification, yet have not introduced new categories to the literature (Cui et
al., 2018; Darling et al., 2015; Le et al., 2011; Musuva et al., 2019; Qabajeh et al., 2018; Shirazi et al.,
2018). Especially, the phishing awareness mechanisms developed since then have used these URL
obfuscation techniques as the basis in organising the teaching content (Arachchilage et al., 2016; Sheng
et al., 2008, 2008; Wen et al., 2019). The content of anti-phishing educational games also follows the
same pattern of simulated phishing attacks where they synthetically develop the possible phishing URLs
by following the URL obfuscation techniques. Furthermore, Le et al. in 2011 have revealed that URL
features alone are enough to identify malicious URLs (Le et al., 2011). Within the URL obfuscation
techniques, the Bag of Word approach has also been employed where users are trained to suspect URLs
that contain top trick words identified. Simulated phishing awareness programs10 11 highly use these lists
of words to train people to look carefully.
Since the URL obfuscation techniques presented by Garera et al. 2007 have remained unchanged for
many years now, the topicality of these techniques against the contemporary phishing URLs is an
important research question. Importantly the anti-phishing tools and awareness programs developed
based on these obfuscation techniques run the risk of being outdated (Arachchialge, 2012). It's
interesting to see that, while developing PhishDef (Le et al., 2011) in 2011 the researchers have extended
the word-based features by Garera et al. (2007), yet have used all other concepts without any change.
We identified that existing phishing awareness interventions haven’t conducted a thorough analysis of
contemporary phishing URLs before program development as they are depending on the phishing URL
categorisations of Garera et al. 2007.
On the other hand, the evaluation criteria employed in existing phishing awareness programs are more
focused on measuring user interaction improvement and success rate of user behaviour modification
techniques with pre and post-tests (Arachchilage et al., 2016; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Sheng et al.,
2008; Wen et al., 2019; Wu, 2006). However, the primary expectation of anti-phishing education is to
improve users’ security knowledge to combat against the contemporary phishing attacks (Musuva et al.,
2019). Cybercriminals are continuously learning and keep inventing various new strategies
(Kumaraguru et al., 2007). Therefore, investigating the URL obfuscation techniques used in antiphishing education against the contemporary phishing attacks is a timely requirement.

3 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN
This research focused on investigating the obfuscation techniques of phishing URLs used in antiphishing education against the contemporary phishing attacks. Previous research on phishing
classification research has been investigated in the binary classification of phishing attacks where they
decided whether or not a given URL is malicious (Darling et al., 2015; Whittaker et al., 2010). On the
other hand, phishing attack measurement studies such as Garera et al. 2007 have categorised the
phishing attacks based on their characteristics. Therefore, we conducted a follow-up analysis of the URL
obfuscation techniques against contemporary phishing URLs from PhishTank.com12.

3.1 Data Used
Our study obtained a contemporary phishing URL dataset downloaded from PhishTank 12 on 05th May
2019. PhishTank.com12 is a well-known non-profit community database that maintains a blacklist of
phishing URLs reported and verified by volunteers. For this study, we downloaded the dataset in a CSV
file and it contained a total of 10078 verified phishing URLs. The collected phishing URLs ranged from
real-world phishing attempts reported between 2008 and 2019. We used the Python programming
language 13 to conduct the initial feature analysis of phishing URLs due to the cost-effective and
12
13

https://www.phishtank.com
https://www.python.org
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supportive nature. URL Parsing Library (URLLib 14) was used for the lexical analysis on the URL
components described in Figure1.

Figure 1: URL structure

3.2 Structure of URLs
Uniform Resource Locator (URL), or the web address, is a reference to a web resource that specifies its
location on a computer network (Berners-Lee et al., 2005). As highlighted in the literature, previous
research has proved that careful attention to URL lexical is sufficient enough (Le et al., 2011) to identify
the legitimacy of a website. IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) (Berners-Lee et al., 2005) has
specified the URL structure in 6 components as per Figure 1. Table 1 shows the URL component
distribution in our dataset. We analysed the PhishTank12 dataset against below URL components to
identify the URL obfuscation techniques that can be used to train end-users to detect phishing threats.
URL Component

Description

% of dataset (2019)
(N=10078)

Scheme
Netloc (Hostname)
Path
Parameters
Query
Fragment

network communication protocol i.e. http, "https", "ftp" "mailto"
network location - primary hostname or domain
hierarchical path from root domain to the target web page
URL parameter (Path Param) to identify a specific resource
provides filtration to resources available in the given path
contains a fragment identifier

100%
100%
99.5%
0.4%
19.8%
0.7%

Table 1. URL components distribution in our dataset

3.3 Feature Analysis
This research followed a similar approach of phishing URL analysis presented in the work by Garera et
al. 2007. Their study has categorised website features into four groups as Page Based, Domain Based,
Type Based and Word-Based features. From that Type Based features (URL obfuscation types) and
Word-Based features (suggestive token words found in URLs) have been analysed under website URL
features. Following that, in this research, the contemporary phishing URLs obtained from PhishTank11
were analysed under Type-based features and Word-based features and compared with the results
presented in the study by Garera et al. (2007).
Our study retrieved 10078 phishing URLs from PhishTank11, whereas Garera et al. (2007) have had only
1245 phishing URLs in their training blacklist dataset from Google. The results were compared in terms
of percentages to better understand the composition of URL obfuscation techniques. Under type based
features we analysed the availability of Type I (Obfuscating hostname with an IP Address) and Type II
(Obfuscating the host with another domain) within the contemporary phishing URL dataset and
compared that with the results of Garera et al. (Garera et al., 2007). Type III obfuscation technique
(Obfuscating with large URLs) is on the length of the URL, especially on the misleading characters added
at the end of a legitimate domain. Then the study was conducted on the word-based features presented
in Garera et al. (2007) to understand the suggestive word tokens in contemporary phishing URLs.

4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We investigated the contemporary phishing attacks reported in real-world against the URL obfuscation
techniques that are used in anti-phishing educational content development. Our results showed that the
composition of URL obfuscation techniques has significantly changed over time. The Type I
(Obfuscating hostname with an IP Address), which was a popular obfuscation technique in 2007 with
63.6% of occurrence only has an insignificant value of 1.03% in our contemporary dataset. The usage of

14

https://docs.python.org/3/library/urllib.html
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Type II obfuscation technique (Obfuscating the host with another domain) also have reduced in the
contemporary dataset by having 26.9% of occurrence.
There were many phishing URLs in our contemporary dataset that do not fit into any of the four existing
URL obfuscation techniques (i.e. four categories identified by Garera et al. (2007)). Therefore, we
analysed the contemporary phishing URL dataset itself to identify new obfuscation techniques. We
revealed, in addition to Garera et al’s. (2007) 4 categories, two major obfuscation techniques which have
not been incorporated into anti-phishing teaching content. It also showed that the most common word
tokens used by phishers have changed over time. Therefore, we further analysed the contemporary
dataset from PhishTank 15 to identify new suggestive word tokens.

4.1 Type Based Features
Table 2 shows the comparison of Type I (Obfuscating hostname with an IP Address i.e. http://
67.210.122.222/apple/login) and Type II (Obfuscating the host with another domain i.e. https://
recovery-confrim-paqe.cf/?facebook.com=chekpoint) URL obfuscation techniques. As shown in Table
2, Type I obfuscation techniques is rarely found in contemporary phishing URLs, we obtained in 2019.
Type II obfuscation technique has also decreased by 12.8% in 2019. Data available in PhishTank.com12
under the spoofed organisation (which indicates the name of the organisation used in the URL path)
was used to identify the Type II Obfuscation Technique. In our dataset, there were only 2718 URLs with
the identified spoofed organisation. However, the majority of the URLs had unresolved target
organisations due to the complexity of the URL formulation. For example, “https://www.wirelesshandsets.com/blueprintcsg/verificationAttempt.php?sf58g...” seems like a wireless headset sales
company and users fell for it. However, there is no existing company or legitimate website under that
name and this falls under the category of unresolved target organisations.
URL Obfuscation Technique

Garera et al. (2007) (N=1245)

Current dataset (2019) (N=10078)

Type I - Obfuscating hostname
with an IP Address
Type II - Obfuscating the host
with another domain

63.6%

1.03%

39.7%

26.9 %

Table 2. Type I and Type II comparison on phishing URLs from 2007 (Garera et al., 2007) vs 2019
In analysing the Type III obfuscation technique (Obfuscating with large URLs), the URLs with large
domain names were identified and then we checked if that domain has words placed intentionally
(delimited by ‘-’, ‘_’, ‘=’, ‘?’, ‘%’) to imitate a target organisation name. For example,
“https://nz1webapps7mpp3manage-my-papl-account.felixkot.biz/signin...”, has a large domain name
with suggestive words placed in the subdomain to make it look like it is linked to paypal.com. In the
analysis by Garera et al. (2007), the average length of additional characters appended to the domain
name of phishing URL was 7.34 characters and the maximum length was 63. In our phishing dataset,
the average length of additional characters appended to the domain was 9.32 with the maximum length
of 73.88 characters. With the results, it seems the Type III obfuscation techniques apply to current data.
In early 2019, there has been a few attempts of phishing with more than 1000 characters in the URL
(Abrams, 2019) using the Obfuscation with a large URL technique (Type III). The largest URL in our
dataset had 1149 characters. Therefore, we can expect phishing attacks with more complex URLs in the
future.

4.2 New URL Obfuscation Techniques for Anti-Phishing Education
As our findings revealed that URL obfuscation techniques identified by Garera et al. 2007 (that have
been incorporated into existing anti-phishing teaching content) are not aligning with the real-world
contemporary phishing threats, we analysed the contemporary dataset itself to investigate new URL
obfuscation techniques. The results below would look obvious for any technically savvy individual, yet
not included in anti-phishing teaching content, and therefore non-technical end-users are highly
susceptible.

4.2.1 Type V: Obfuscating with HTTPS Schema
Technically the HTTPS schema represents the secure and encrypted data communication protocol
between the user's browser and the target site. Browsers display a green padlock icon in the address bar
only to represent secure communication and it is not related to the legitimacy of the website. However
15

https://www.phishtank.com
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according to the survey conducted by PhishLab 16 more than 80% of non-technical users believe green
lock and https indicate that a website is either legitimate and/or safe16.

Figure 2: Https with Green Padlock for phishing URL that targets Paypal.com
Figure 2 shows a phishing website with SSL/TLS certificate and green padlock. Our findings
demonstrate that phishers are increasingly exploiting user’s misbelief in https schema for their
advantage. Table 3 displays the 3231 https URLs we found in our dataset with increased usage pattern
over the years.
Year

Occurrences
of https

Total phishing attacks of the
year in the current dataset

Percentage of
https URLs

2019 (until 05/05/2019)
2018
2017
2016
2015

1477
1543
182
16
3

3930
4068
1249
488
233

37.58%
37.93%
14.57%
3.27%
1.28%

Table 3. Https protocol usage in Phishing URLs
Here we introduce the Type V obfuscation technique – “Obfuscating with HTTPS schema”, as an
additional category type to phishing URL obfuscation categories proposed by Garera et al. 2007.
Type VI: Obfuscating with Internationalized Domain Names
Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) are domain names represented by non-ASCII local language
characters (Richard Ishida (W3C), 2008). IDN was the solution to improve the usability of the Internet
for millions of non-English speaking users by enabling to have domain names in non-ASCII characters.
Punycode is an algorithm employed by web protocols to transform a Unicode string into an ASCII string
(RFC3492 17). Punycode sequences always start with the prefix "xn--" simply to distinguish IDNs from
ordinary domain names. The punycode for the URL in Figure 3 is “xn--oy2b35ckwhba574atvuzkc.com”.

Figure 3: IDN with local language
However, IDN has been exploited by phishers (Liu et al., 2018) in their advantage to mislead the endusers with Unicode characters that have similar appearances to ASCII characters, which are
undetectable in browser address bars. For example, “https://www.apple.com” is not the actual apple
URL as the “a" of apple.com is a Cyrillic “a" (U+0430) rather than the ASCII character “a" (U+0061).
The punycode for the Cyrillic character URL is https://www.xn--pple-43d.com/. We found 24 IDN
URLs in our dataset with increased usage pattern over the years in Table 4.
Year
2019 (until 05/05/2019)
2018
2017
2016
2015

Occurrences in Current dataset (2019) (N=10078)
12
8
1
1
0

Table 4. Usage of IDN in Phishing URLs for camouflage
As the usage of IDN in 2019 until 05/05/2019 has already passed the total number of usages before
2019, we can expect more IDN based phishing attacks in the coming years. Therefore, we introduce this
as the Type VI obfuscation technique – “Obfuscating with Internationalized Domain names”, as an
extension to phishing URL obfuscation types proposed by Garera et al (2007).
16
17

https://info.phishlabs.com/blog/quarter-phishing-attacks-hosted-https-domains
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3492.txt
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4.3 Word Based Features
Word based feature analysis is a commonly used technique in most of automated phishing detection
tools (Cui et al., 2018; Jain and Gupta, 2018; Khonji et al., 2011; Marchal et al., 2016) as it provides more
contextual information on the legitimacy of the URL text. Also, the blacklisted bag of words enhances
the detection of Type IV URL obfuscation technique (obfuscating with unknown or misspelt Domain
name). As per the findings of Garera et al (2007), phishing URLs are found to be containing several
suggestive word tokens frequently. We examined our contemporary phishing URL dataset against these
words to understand whether or not they are still prominent. The comparisons were non case-sensitive
and Boolean (where we only checked whether or not a given word is present in a URL).
Special Words

Garera et al. (2007) (N=1245)

Current dataset (2019) (N=10078)

confirm
account
banking
secure
ebayisapi
webscr
login
signin

4.25%
4.9%
7.95%
9.88%
13.9%
14.2%
21.53%
23.29%

0.893%
5.040 %
0.188%
3.006%
0.019%
0.367%
13.177%
2.937%

Table 5. Word Token feature comparison on phishing URLs in 2007 (Garera et al., 2007)
and current dataset from PhishTank12 (2019)
From the results in Table 5, we can see that except the words “account” and “login” other special words
identified by Garera et al. (2007) are no longer found common in the contemporary phishing URLs. The
usage of word “signin” as dropped by more than 20%. The decreased numbers in words like “webscr” or
“ebayisapi” suggests that the changes in the web development technologies might have influenced
phishers and the way they phish.
In developing PhishDef, the anti-phishing tool (Le et al., 2011), researchers have added four more words
("paypal", "free", "lucky", "bonus") to the suggestive word list of Garera et al. 2007 as an extension.
Therefore, we analysed the frequency of these four words in our dataset to understand the current
situation of using words based features on phishing URLs in 2019. Results in Table 6 showed that the
frequency of the words also has deprived now.
Special Words
paypal
free
lucky
bonus

Percentage in Current dataset (2019) (N=10078)
2.431%
1.716%
0.039%
0.089%

Table 6. Usage of Word Token features added by Le et al. (Le et al., 2011) current dataset
from PhishTank12 (2019)
4.3.1 Lexicon for Phishing URLs in 2019
The results we discussed in above revealed that frequent suggestive words identified by previous
research do not occur in contemporary phishing attacks, we further examined the word frequency in the
dataset retrieved from PhishTank11. Table 7 shows the ten most common words in our contemporary
phishing URL dataset and apart from "login" and "account" all other 8 are new lexicons. Here we
followed the same filtration criteria used by Garera et al. 2007 and discarded all tokens with length<5
as they contained several common technical terms used in website development.
Words
Login
Account
Content
Include
Online

Total No. of URLs
1328
508
505
496
478

Percentage in Current dataset (2019) (N=10078)
13.177%
5.040%
5.010%
4.921%
4.743%
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Words
Sites
Admin
Email
Secur
image
update

Total No. of URLs
461
455
431
422
394
304

Percentage in Current dataset (2019) (N=10078)
4.574%
4.514%
4.276%
4.187%
3.909%
3.016%

Table 7. Frequency of Word Tokens in the current dataset from PhishTank12 (2019)

5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This research focused on investigating the phishing URL obfuscation techniques incorporated in antiphishing education against the contemporary phishing attacks. The URL obfuscation techniques
presented a decade ago by Garera et al. 2007 are still being used in anti-phishing educational
interventions. Over time attackers have abandoned the already identified and educated methods of URL
obfuscation techniques and keep inventing new ways of deceiving. Our research findings revealed that
the URL obfuscation techniques used in existing anti-phishing teaching do not help people to detect
contemporary phishing attacks. The Type I obfuscation technique (Obfuscating hostname with an IP
Address) presented by Garera et al. 2007 had 33.32% representation of the total phishing attacks, yet in
our contemporary dataset, it has only 1.03% of insignificant usage. Adding to that, Type II (Obfuscating
the host with another domain) technique has also decreased by 12.8%. Therefore, one can argue that
existing anti-phishing educational interventions are limited in success in mitigating contemporary
phishing attacks due to their outdated teaching content incorporated. Moreover, teaching outdated antiphishing techniques might not help combating contemporary phishing attacks. In addition to Garera et
al’s (2007) categorisation, we have also identified two new URL obfuscating techniques, which are:
1. Type V - Obfuscating with HTTPS schema.
2. Type VI - Obfuscating with Internationalized Domain names
Identified two new obfuscation techniques have a trending usage for phishing where 37.58% of phishing
URLs of 2019 (until 05/05/2019) have used https schema. 12 IDN URLs have been reported until
05/05/2019, which is higher than the total number of IDNs reported in previous years. These new
obfuscation techniques need to be incorporated into contemporary teaching content (in our case,
phishing URLs) of anti-phishing educational interventions to better educate end users to prevent
phishing attacks. Apart from that, these two new URL obfuscation techniques can also be used as
features in creating new automated phishing detection tools. In future work, we will analyse various
contemporary phishing datasets to identify more hidden URL obfuscation techniques, which have not
been incorporated in developing anti-phishing educational interventions.
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